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OPINION 
______________ 
 
GREENAWAY, JR., Circuit Judge. 
After receiving a tip from a reliable source that 
individuals in a white Toyota Camry were carrying firearms, 
police officers in St. Thomas, Virgin Islands initiated a traffic 
stop of the vehicle.  During the traffic stop, a firearm was 
discovered on the driver, Appellant Ahmoi Lewis (―Lewis‖).  
Before pleading guilty to two firearm offenses, Lewis 
unsuccessfully moved to suppress the firearm as the fruit of 
an unlawful search and seizure.  We must determine whether 
the traffic stop was supported by the requisite reasonable 
suspicion of criminal activity under the Fourth Amendment 
based on either: (1) the illegal tints on the vehicle’s windows; 
or (2) the tip that firearms were in the possession of the 
individuals in the vehicle.  We hold that neither basis 
establishes the reasonable suspicion necessary for the traffic 
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stop.  Hence, the firearm discovered on Lewis should have 
been suppressed.  We will vacate Lewis’s judgment of 
conviction and sentence, reverse the denial of his motion to 
suppress, and remand for further proceedings.    
I. BACKGROUND 
On July 28, 2010, the District Court held a pretrial 
hearing on Lewis’s motion to suppress.  The first law 
enforcement officer to testify at the suppression hearing was 
Officer Evans Jackson (―Jackson‖), a peace officer employed 
in the enforcement section of the Virgin Islands Department 
of Planning and Natural Resources.  Jackson testified that on 
April 9, 2010, he received a phone call from a reliable source 
stating that there were firearms in a white Toyota Camry, 
with the number ―181‖ in the license plate, located in the 
vicinity of the Gottlieb gas station.  Jackson had known the 
source for approximately two years at the time and testified 
that he had received reliable information from the source in 
the past.
1
  The phone call was brief, lasting approximately 
one minute.  Jackson did not inquire about how the source 
                                              
1
 Jackson’s testimony about having received reliable 
information from the source in the past was contradictory.  
Jackson testified that the first time he received a credible tip 
from the source was approximately two weeks prior to the tip 
he received on April 9, 2010.  (App. 43.)  However, Jackson 
also testified that this first credible tip was received around 
―late April, early June‖ in 2010 (App. 33), even though 
information provided at that time would have post-dated the 
tip received in this case.  The District Court concluded that 
Jackson’s source was reliable.  (App. 102-03.)  Because the 
reliability of the tip is not integral to our decision, we will not 
address the District Court’s factual determination. 
4 
 
learned of the information in the tip.  More importantly, the 
source provided no details about the legal status of the 
firearms.   
Jackson was traveling on foot at the time that he 
received the tip, without his patrol vehicle.  He determined 
that he could not investigate the tip himself.  Jackson called 
his partner, Officer Gerald Mercer (―Mercer‖), and asked to 
be picked up.  Mercer was off-duty at the time, and Jackson 
instead asked Mercer whether any other officer was nearby.  
Mercer replied that Officer Kendelth Wharton (―Wharton‖) 
was next to him.  Jackson spoke to Wharton and relayed the 
tip that he had received about the white Toyota Camry.  
Jackson had no further involvement in the traffic stop. 
The only testimony at the suppression hearing 
specifically related to the traffic stop came from Officer Jose 
Mendez (―Mendez‖), an officer with the Virgin Islands Police 
Department.  Mendez testified that he responded to a request 
for assistance from Wharton over the police radio system in 
the area of the Ulla Muller Elementary School.  Mendez was 
the second officer to arrive on scene.  Upon Mendez’s arrival, 
Wharton had already initiated the traffic stop of Lewis’s 
vehicle.
2
  Wharton was positioned by the driver’s side of the 
                                              
2
 Although subpoenaed by the Government to testify at 
the suppression hearing, Wharton did not appear, prompting 
the Government to request a bench warrant for his arrest.  
Questioning whether Wharton had ever received the subpoena 
in accordance with police protocol, the District Court 
reasoned that a bench warrant should not be issued.  Counsel 
for Lewis argued that, as the police officer that initiated the 
traffic stop, Wharton’s testimony was critical and moved to 
stay the hearing. The District Court declined to do so.  The 
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vehicle, and Mendez positioned himself by the passenger’s 
side.  Mendez observed that the vehicle was heavily tinted, 
preventing both him and Wharton from seeing how many 
occupants were inside. 
Although the testimony was unclear as to how many 
occupants were inside the vehicle, Lewis was the driver and 
Jesus Grant (―Grant‖), Lewis’s co-defendant, was in the front 
passenger’s seat.  Lewis and Grant were ordered out of the 
vehicle individually.  Based on their respective positions on 
the street, Wharton handled Lewis when he exited the vehicle, 
while Mendez handled Grant.  When Mendez asked Grant if 
he had any weapons on him, Grant became argumentative, a 
struggle ensued, and Mendez eventually placed Grant in 
handcuffs.  Upon frisking him for weapons, Mendez 
discovered a hard object in Grant’s waist area.  Mendez 
searched further and discovered a firearm on Grant, at which 
point Mendez placed Grant under arrest.  Mendez had no 
knowledge of Wharton’s interaction with Lewis but noted 
that Lewis also was placed under arrest. 
On cross-examination, Lewis’s counsel questioned 
Mendez about whether Wharton provided any information 
about why he initiated the traffic stop of the vehicle: 
Q. [W]hat did you hear on the 
911 call that indicated 
                                                                                                     
District Court determined that because the Government bore 
the burden of persuasion on Lewis’s motion to suppress, 
Wharton’s failure to appear only inured to the Government’s 
detriment.  Wharton’s testimony would have been undeniably 
essential given the focus of our inquiry on the legality of the 
traffic stop.        
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[Wharton] needed 
assistance for a traffic 
stop? 
A. Well, to my understanding, 
I don’t know what was his 
reasons to make that stop.  
All I responded was [a] 
request of a fellow officer, 
he needed assistance in 
making a stop. . . . 
Q. The point is that you don’t 
know whether he was 
making a traffic stop 
because he was planning to 
stop a vehicle in the traffic, 
or whether there was a 
traffic violation.  Is that 
correct? 
A. That’s correct. 
(App. 64-65.) 
Officer Terrance Celestine (―Celestine‖), an officer in 
the Traffic Bureau of the Virgin Islands Police Department, 
testified about what happened to the vehicle following the 
arrest.  Celestine testified that he received a phone call from 
Wharton on April 9, 2010, requesting his assistance in 
determining whether the tints on a vehicle involved in a 
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traffic stop were in violation of Virgin Islands law.
3
  Wharton 
informed Celestine that the vehicle was located under the 
sally port at the Virgin Islands Police Department.  On April 
10, 2010, the day after the traffic stop, Celestine inspected the 
vehicle’s tints.  Based on his initial inspection, the tint on the 
vehicle surpassed the AS1 line—a demarcation on a 
windshield that serves as a boundary rendering illegal any 
obstruction crossing below the line.  Using a tint meter, 
Celestine discovered that the tints far exceeded the 35% 
threshold permissible under Virgin Islands law.
4
  Celestine 
issued a citation that day for illegal tints. 
After the three officers testified, the District Court 
heard argument on the motions.  The Government asserted 
that the totality of the circumstances—the tip Jackson 
received from the reliable source and the tints that Celestine 
discovered on the vehicle—rendered the traffic stop 
constitutionally valid.  Lewis’s counsel, on the other hand, 
argued that suppression of the firearm was warranted because 
Jackson’s source was unreliable and the tip failed to provide 
any information that would lead officers to believe that Lewis 
illegally possessed the firearm. 
                                              
3
 Celestine was certified to examine the legality of a 
vehicle’s tints. 
 
4
 The numerical percentage of a tint is directly 
proportional to the amount of light that can pass through the 
window.  As the percentage of a tint decreases, less light can 
pass through the window, rendering both the window and the 
inside of the vehicle darker to an outside observer.  (App. 48-
49.) 
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In a ruling from the bench, the District Court 
concluded that suppression of the firearm recovered from 
Lewis was not warranted.  The District Court first addressed 
whether the tip that Jackson received provided the requisite 
level of reasonable suspicion to conduct the traffic stop: 
[T]he Court . . . agrees with the 
defense that the tip certainly 
cannot be the basis for the stop, 
because the fact that someone has 
a firearm is not a basis for a stop, 
in and of itself.  And I believe 
there’s case law in our circuit that 
makes that very clear, because the 
ownership of a firearm is not 
illegal in the Virgin Islands.  You 
simply have to have a license, of 
course, to possess one.  But 
someone saying that someone has 
a firearm doesn’t mean that you 
can just stop them.  So a stop 
based on the tip certainly would 
present problems for the 
government. 
(App. 103.) 
 The District Court then determined that the illegal tints 
provided the necessary justification for the traffic stop: 
But that’s not all that’s attendant 
here.  In fact, what we have here 
is a – the tip information was that 
there were some firearms, there 
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was a description of the vehicle, 
there was a description, I believe, 
identification of the specific 
license plate number for that 
vehicle.  But there’s more.  And 
this is, I think, what presents a 
problem for the defense.  The 
vehicle that was described was 
heavily tinted.  The testimony 
during this hearing revealed that.  
And the Court is aware that it is a 
violation of the law to have tint in 
excess of a certain amount.  So 
while there’s been some concern 
about the motivation for the stop, 
again, that’s not dispositive here.  
Once there is a valid reason for 
the stop – here, a tint that exceeds 
the limit . . . . even if it’s 
pretextual, even if there is some 
motive that is questioned by the 
defense, there is certainly a valid 
reason for the stop:  a violation of 
the tint requirements. 
(App. 103-04.)  The District Court went on to reason that, 
once the traffic stop was initiated, the resulting discovery of 
the firearm on Lewis was lawful. 
 On October 5, 2010, Lewis conditionally pled guilty to 
two of the eleven counts in the charging information:  Count 
Three (possession of a stolen firearm) and Count Six 
(unauthorized possession of a firearm).  The District Court 
sentenced Lewis on January 13, 2011 to a term of fourteen 
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months of imprisonment on Count Three, a concurrent term 
of fourteen months on Count Six, and three years of 
supervised release. 
 On January 14, 2011, Lewis filed a timely appeal from 
the judgment of conviction, challenging the District Court’s 
denial of his motion to suppress.
5
 
II. JURISDICTION AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
 The District Court had jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 
3231.  We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 to review 
the District Court’s judgment of conviction.  We review a 
district court’s order denying a motion to suppress under a 
mixed standard of review.  United States v. Tracey, 597 F.3d 
140, 146 (3d Cir. 2010).  We review findings of fact for clear 
error, but we exercise plenary review over legal 
determinations.  Id.   
III. ANALYSIS 
The Fourth Amendment protects the public from 
―unreasonable searches and seizures.‖  U.S. Const. amend. 
IV.  ―Generally, for a seizure to be reasonable under the 
Fourth Amendment, it must be effectuated with a warrant 
based on probable cause.‖   United States v. Robertson, 305 
F.3d 164, 167 (3d Cir. 2002) (citation omitted).  A well-
established exception to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant 
requirement permits an officer to ―conduct a brief, 
investigatory stop when the officer has a reasonable, 
articulable suspicion that criminal activity is afoot.‖  Illinois 
                                              
5
 Grant also pled guilty to certain offenses but filed no 
appeal. 
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v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 123 (2000) (citing Terry v. Ohio, 
392 U.S. 1, 30 (1968)).   
 
The requirement of reasonable suspicion for a Terry 
stop-and-frisk applies with equal force to a traffic stop of a 
vehicle.  United States v. Delfin-Colina, 464 F.3d 392, 397 
(3d Cir. 2006).  When determining whether an officer 
possessed reasonable suspicion to conduct a traffic stop, we 
must consider the totality of the circumstances.  United States 
v. Silveus, 542 F.3d 993, 1000 (3d Cir. 2008).  Once a valid 
traffic stop is initiated, ―an officer who develops a reasonable, 
articulable suspicion of criminal activity may expand the 
scope of an inquiry beyond the reason for the stop and detain 
the vehicle and its occupants for further investigation.‖  
United States v. Givan, 320 F.3d 452, 458 (3d Cir. 2003) 
(citation omitted).  Where reasonable suspicion for the traffic 
stop is lacking, the evidentiary fruits of the traffic stop must 
be suppressed.  United States v. Johnson, 592 F.3d 442, 447 
(3d Cir. 2010).   
 
Here, we must determine whether Wharton possessed 
the requisite reasonable suspicion to initiate the traffic stop of 
the vehicle. 
A. Illegal Tints on the Vehicle 
The District Court concluded that the excessive tints 
provided a legal justification for the traffic stop, regardless of 
whether Wharton was motivated by the desire to investigate 
the tip about the firearms.  We have noted that ―the Supreme 
Court established a bright-line rule that any technical 
violation of a traffic code legitimizes a stop, even if the stop 
is merely pretext for an investigation of some other crime.‖  
12 
 
United States v. Mosley, 454 F.3d 249, 252 (3d Cir. 2006) 
(citing Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806 (1996)).   
While case law continues to afford police officers 
increasing latitude to initiate traffic stops that pass 
constitutional muster, see id., our obligation to scrutinize 
police action is no less demanding.  We agree with the 
District Court’s determination that pretextual traffic stops 
supported by reasonable suspicion do not run afoul of the 
Fourth Amendment.  That proposition is not in dispute.  But 
we cannot lend our imprimatur to the District Court’s 
erroneous conclusion that the illegal tints provided the 
necessary pretext in this case.  Needless to say, a pretextual 
traffic stop requires the officer to have observed a traffic 
violation prior to initiating the traffic stop.  Otherwise, the 
officer’s motivation for the stop could not be pretextual.  The 
corollary of this fundamental principle is that ex post facto 
justifications are impermissible. 
After receiving testimony at the suppression hearing, 
the District Court reasoned that the tints provided a legal 
justification for the traffic stop.  This determination was 
unsupported by the factual record.  Based on our review of 
the testimony, the only logical conclusion is that the tints 
were a contrived, after-the-fact explanation for the traffic 
stop.  As such, the tints cannot justify the stop of Lewis’s 
vehicle.    
Jackson provided no testimony at all about the 
vehicle’s tints.  This is unsurprising given that his role was 
limited to relaying the tip to Wharton that precipitated his 
search for Lewis’s vehicle.  Jackson never observed Lewis’s 
vehicle and had no communication with Wharton about the 
traffic stop.  While Mendez participated in the traffic stop, his 
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first observation of the vehicle’s tints did not occur until after 
he arrived on scene.  By that point, Lewis’s vehicle had been 
pulled over, and the occupants were on the cusp of being 
ordered out of the vehicle.  Moreover, Mendez testified on 
cross-examination that he could not identify the reason for the 
traffic stop and had not discussed the issue with Wharton.  
Whatever testimony Celestine provided about his 
inspection of the vehicle’s illegal tints is of no moment to our 
determination.  Celestine had no involvement in the actual 
traffic stop.  His testimony shed no light on why the traffic 
stop occurred as it did.  He had no knowledge of whether 
Wharton observed a traffic violation prior to initiating the 
stop of the vehicle.  See Florida v. J.L., 529 U.S. 266, 271 
(2000) (―The reasonableness of official suspicion must be 
measured by what the officers knew before they conducted 
their search.‖).  Celestine’s only involvement in this case—
the inspection of the vehicle’s tints—occurred the day after 
Lewis was arrested.  This inspection is inconsequential to our 
inquiry.  The Government’s undue reliance on Celestine’s 
testimony is insufficient to resuscitate the Government’s 
doomed argument.   
The absence of testimony that Wharton or any other 
officer observed a traffic violation, prior to the initiation of 
the traffic stop, precludes a finding that the stop was 
pretextual.  See Mosley, 454 F.3d at 251.  The District Court 
erred in concluding that the illegal tints provided a pretextual 
justification for the traffic stop.  We are left to conclude on 
these facts that the vehicle was stopped because of the tip 
about the firearms.   
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B. Tip Regarding the Firearms 
 We can nevertheless affirm the District Court’s denial 
of Lewis’s motion to suppress if the tip that Jackson received 
about the firearms in the white Toyota Camry itself provided 
reasonable suspicion for the traffic stop. 
In United States v. Ubiles, 224 F.3d 213 (3d Cir. 
2000), we analyzed whether reasonable suspicion existed to 
support a Terry stop in the Virgin Islands.  There, individuals 
in St. Thomas were celebrating a street carnival festival 
during which alcohol consumption was widespread.  Id. at 
215.  An anonymous informant approached several officers 
and informed them that a young man (the defendant) standing 
in the crowd of celebrants had a firearm in his possession.  Id.  
The informant described the defendant’s clothing and 
appearance but did not state that the defendant was acting in a 
suspicious manner or that the firearm was unlawfully 
possessed.  Id.  After the informant pointed in the direction of 
the defendant, officers walked over to the young man.  Id.  
Although the defendant exhibited no suspicious behavior, 
officers proceeded to conduct a pat-down search and 
discovered an unregistered firearm with an obliterated serial 
number.  Id. 
At a hearing on the defendant’s motion to suppress the 
firearm, officers testified that they based their decision to stop 
and frisk the defendant solely on the anonymous informant’s 
tip.  Id.  The district court denied the defendant’s motion to 
suppress the firearm.  Id.  We held that the search and seizure 
of the defendant was unlawful and vacated the conviction.  Id. 
at 214.  We premised our decision on two considerations: 
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First, it is not a crime to possess a 
firearm in the Virgin Islands—
even when standing in a crowd.  
Second, the anonymous tipster 
who approached the authorities 
had said nothing that would 
indicate that [the defendant] 
possessed the gun unlawfully 
(e.g., without registration); that he 
was committing or about to 
commit a crime; or that he posed 
a threat to the officers or anyone 
in the crowd. 
Id.  We analogized the tip provided by the informant about 
the firearm to a tip that the defendant ―possessed a wallet, a 
perfectly legal act in the Virgin Islands, and the authorities 
had stopped him for this reason.‖  Id. at 218.  ―For all the 
officers knew, even assuming the reliability of the tip that [the 
defendant] possessed a gun, [the defendant] was another 
celebrant lawfully exercising his right under Virgin Islands 
law to possess a gun in public.‖  Id.  Absent additional 
information, ―a mere allegation that a suspect possesses a 
firearm, as dangerous as firearms may be, [does not] justify 
an officer in stopping a suspect absent the reasonable 
suspicion required by Terry.‖  Id. at 217. 
Less than three months after our decision in Ubiles, we 
clarified that ―reasonable suspicion does not require that the 
suspect’s acts must always be themselves criminal.‖  United 
States v. Valentine, 232 F.3d 350, 356 (3d Cir. 2000) (noting 
that the ―Supreme Court has found reasonable suspicion 
based on acts capable of innocent explanation‖).  In 
Valentine, the totality of the circumstances—an in-person tip 
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that the defendant was carrying a firearm, received in a high-
crime area of Irvington, New Jersey at 1:00 a.m., where the 
defendant and his companions walked away upon observing a 
police car—provided officers with reasonable suspicion to 
conduct a Terry stop.
6
  Id. at 357.  We have since concluded 
on several occasions that a totality of the circumstances 
inquiry rendered a Terry stop lawful.  See, e.g., United States 
v. Torres, 534 F.3d 207, 213 (3d Cir. 2008) (concluding that 
tip provided by anonymous informant that man brandished 
firearm at gas station in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania was 
reliable to justify traffic stop). 
For cases arising out of the Virgin Islands, however, 
the treatment afforded firearms under territorial law continues 
to be of paramount importance in our analysis.  In United 
States v. Gatlin, 613 F.3d 374 (3d Cir. 2010), an officer 
received a tip from a reliable source that a man was walking 
on a street in Wilmington, Delaware with a firearm in his 
jacket.  Id. at 376-77.  Based on the man’s description, 
officers responded to the area where the informant indicated 
that the man could be found.  Id. at 377.  Officers located the 
man, handcuffed him, and patted him down, finding an 
unlicensed handgun in violation of Delaware law.  Id.      
We noted that the facts in Gatlin resembled those in 
Ubiles—i.e., the sole evidence to support the Terry stop was a 
tip about a firearm—but nonetheless concluded that 
reasonable suspicion existed to frisk the defendant for 
                                              
6
 Given the totality of the circumstances regarding the 
tip, we declined to address the Government’s alternative 
argument that New Jersey, unlike the Virgin Islands, 
presumes that an individual lacks a permit to carry a 
concealed firearm.  Id. at 357. 
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weapons.  Id. at 378-79.  Critical to our analysis was the 
presumption under Delaware law, unlike in the Virgin 
Islands, that an individual has no license to carry a concealed 
firearm.  Id.  The reliable tip coupled with the presumption of 
illegality provided officers with reasonable suspicion to 
conduct an investigatory stop within the confines of Terry.  
Id. at 379. 
The District Court concluded that the tip Jackson 
received, which he relayed to Wharton, was insufficient to 
justify the traffic stop.  We agree.  It is lawful for certain 
individuals in the Virgin Islands to carry a firearm provided 
that a license is obtained.  See V.I. Code Ann. tit. 23, § 454.  
Ubiles recognized that the possession of a firearm in the 
Virgin Islands, in and of itself, does not provide officers with 
reasonable suspicion to conduct a Terry stop.  224 F.3d at 217 
(―[A] mere allegation that a suspect possesses a firearm, as 
dangerous as firearms may be, [does not] justify an officer in 
stopping a suspect absent the reasonable suspicion.‖).  Indeed, 
Virgin Islands law contains no presumption that an individual 
lacks a permit to carry a firearm.  Gatlin, 613 F.3d at 378-79.  
As we observed in Gatlin, the Government bears the burden 
of proof in the Virgin Islands that the defendant had no 
license for a recovered firearm.  Id. at 379 (citing United 
States v. McKie, 112 F.3d 626, 630 (3d Cir. 1997)). 
Our conclusion here that the tip was insufficient to 
justify the traffic stop of Lewis’s vehicle flows logically from 
the reasoning in Ubiles.  Jackson received a tip that 
individuals in a white Toyota Camry, bearing the number 
―181‖ in the license plate, had firearms in their possession.  
Jackson testified that his conversation with his source was 
brief and that no information was provided about the legality 
of the firearms.  This information alone does not permit an 
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officer to suspect—let alone reasonably suspect—that 
possession of either firearm was illegal or that the firearms 
were being used in a criminal manner.
7
  Jackson relayed the 
tip about innocuous conduct to Wharton, who proceeded to 
initiate a traffic stop of the vehicle.  Absent any information 
about the criminality of the firearms, the mere possession of 
the firearms could not provide Wharton with reasonable 
suspicion to stop the vehicle.
8
 
The Government argues that the totality of the 
circumstances—based on the tip and the illegal tints—
justified the traffic stop.  (Appellee’s Br. at 7.)  The 
Government misapprehends the totality of the circumstances 
standard.  Facts known to an officer at the time of a Terry 
stop must bear individual significance if they are to be 
considered in the aggregate.  See United States v. Mathurin, 
                                              
7
 This is true even assuming the reliability of the tip, 
which contained no information about suspicious activity.  Cf. 
United States v. Johnson, 592 F.3d 442, 449 (3d Cir. 2010) 
(finding anonymous informant’s tip reliable where informant 
observed criminal activity in progress).      
 
8
 This is not to say that an officer must receive 
information about or observe criminal behavior in progress to 
constitute reasonable suspicion.  To the contrary, as we noted, 
―reasonable suspicion may be based on acts capable of 
innocent explanation.‖  United States v. Whitfield, 634 F.3d 
741, 744 (3d Cir. 2010) (internal quotation marks and citation 
omitted).  But, whereas here, the sole information provided 
by the informant concerned the mere possession of firearms 
in a vehicle in the Virgin Islands, without more, there are no 
facts upon which to predicate reasonable suspicion. 
19 
 
561 F.3d 170, 174-75 (3d Cir. 2009) (―We will examine the 
factors separately to address their individual significance, and 
then in the aggregate to assess the agents’ reasonable 
suspicion under our totality of the circumstances inquiry.‖).   
As we explained in supra Part III.A., based on the 
testimony at the suppression hearing, the illegal tints on the 
vehicle were an impermissible ex post facto justification for 
the traffic stop.  The informant’s tip about the white Toyota 
Camry is equally of no aid to the Government.  We cannot 
consider in the aggregate these two facts that individually 
have no relevance to our totality of the circumstances 
assessment.
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IV. CONCLUSION 
Because neither the illegal tints nor the tip was 
sufficient, the Government failed to meet its burden of 
proving that the traffic stop was supported by reasonable 
suspicion.  See Delfin-Colina, 464 F.3d at 397.  The District 
Court erred by not ordering suppression of the firearm 
discovered on Lewis.  We will vacate Lewis’s judgment of 
conviction and sentence, reverse the denial of his motion to 
suppress, and remand for further proceedings consistent with 
this opinion. 
                                              
9
 At oral argument, counsel for the Government 
conceded that the tip was insufficient, stating that suppression 
of the firearm discovered on Lewis would be required if the 
tip remained the sole support for the traffic stop. 
